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Abstract
This paper outlines the design of ‘Quest-V’, which is implemented
as a collection of separate kernels operating together as a dis-
tributed system on a chip. Quest-V uses virtualization techniques to
isolate kernels and prevent local faults from affecting remote ker-
nels. This leads to a high-confidence multikernel approach, where
failures of system subcomponents do not render the entire system
inoperable. A virtual machine monitor for each kernel keeps track
of shadow page table mappings that control immutable memory ac-
cess capabilities. This ensures a level of security and fault tolerance
in situations where a service in one kernel fails, or is corrupted by a
malicious attack. Communication is supported between kernels us-
ing shared memory regions for message passing. Similarly, device
driver data structures are shareable between kernels to avoid the
need for complex I/O virtualization, or communication with a ded-
icated kernel responsible for I/O. In Quest-V, device interrupts are
delivered directly to a kernel, rather than via a monitor that deter-
mines the destination. Apart from bootstrapping each kernel, han-
dling faults and managing shadow page tables, the monitors are not
needed. This differs from conventional virtual machine systems in
which a central monitor, or hypervisor, is responsible for schedul-
ing and management of host resources amongst a set of guest ker-
nels. In this paper we show how Quest-V can implement novel fault
isolation and recovery techniques that are not possible with conven-
tional systems. We also show how the costs of using virtualization
for isolation of system services does not add undue overheads to
the overall system performance.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.4.7 [Operating Systems]:
Organization and Design
General Terms Design, Reliability
Keywords Virtualization, Multicore, Fault Isolation and Recovery
1. Introduction
Multicore processors are now ubiquitous in today’s microprocessor
and microcontroller industry. It is common to see two to four cores
per package in embedded and desktop platforms, with server-class
processors such as the Sun Niagara 3 having 16 cores and up to
8 hardware threads per core. Similarly, Intel’s Single-chip Cloud
Computer (SCC) supports 48 cores, and other manufacturers are
following suit with an increase in core count driven in part by trade-
offs in power and computational demands. Many emerging multi-
core processors now have support for hardware virtualization (e.g.,
Intel VT and AMD-V CPUs). Virtualization has re-emerged in the
last decade as a way to consolidate workloads on servers, thereby
providing an effective means to increase resource utilization while
still ensuring logical isolation between guest virtual machines.
Hardware advances with respect to multicore technology have
not been met by software developments. In particular, multicore
processors pose significant challenges to operating system de-
sign [6, 8, 39]. Not only is it difficult to design software sys-
tems that scale to large numbers of processing cores, there are nu-
merous micro-architectural factors that affect software execution,
leading to reduced efficiency and unpredictability. Shared on-chip
caches [21, 40], memory bus bandwidth contention [44], hard-
ware interrupts [43], instruction pipelines, hardware prefetchers,
amongst other factors, all contribute to variability in task execution
times.
Coupled with the challenges posed by multicore processors
are the inherent complexities in modern operating systems. Such
complex interactions between software components inevitably lead
to program faults and potential compromises to system integrity.
Various faults may occur due to memory violations (e.g., stack and
buffer overflows, null pointer dereferences and jumps or stores to
out of range addresses [15, 28]), CPU violations (e.g., starvation
and deadlocks), and I/O violations (e.g., mismanagement of access
rights to files and devices). Device drivers, in particular, are a
known source of potential dangers to operating systems, as they
are typically written by third party sources and usually execute with
kernel privileges. To address this, various researchers have devised
techniques to verify the correctness of drivers, or to sandbox them
from the rest of the kernel [35, 36].
In this paper, we present a new system design that uses both vir-
tualization capabilities and the redundancy offered by multiple pro-
cessing cores, to develop a reliable system that is resilient to soft-
ware faults. Our system, called ‘Quest-V’ is designed as a multik-
ernel [6], or distributed system on a chip. It uses virtualization tech-
niques to isolate kernels on different cores of a multicore proces-
sor. Shadow page tables [3] securely isolate separate kernel images
in physical memory. These page tables map each kernels ‘guest’
physical memory to host (or machine) physical memory. Changes
to protection bits within shadow page tables can only be performed
by a monitor associated with the kernel on the corresponding core.
This ensures that any illegal memory accesses (e.g., write attempts
on read-only pages) within a kernel are caught by the correspond-
ing monitor. Our system has similarities to Barrelfish, in that it is a
multikernel, while also using virtualization similar to systems such
as Xen [5]. We differ from traditional virtualized systems [9] by
only trapping into a monitor when a fault occurs. In all other sit-
uations, execution proceeds within the kernels or user-spaces on
each core. Interrupts and communication directly involve kernels,
without monitor intervention. Thus, for the most part, only memory
virtualization using shadow paging is used for fault isolation.
We show how Quest-V does not incur significant operational
overheads compared to a non-virtualized version of our system,
simply called Quest, designed for SMP platforms. We observe that
communication, interrupt handling, thread scheduling and system
call costs are on par with the costs of conventional SMP systems,
with the advantage that Quest-V can tolerate system component
failures without the need for system reboots.
We show how Quest-V can recover from component failure us-
ing a network device driver example, whereby we detect software
failure and restart a comparable driver either in a locally-recovered
kernel or in an alternate kernel on another core. This serves as an
example of the ‘self-healing’ characteristics of Quest-V, with on-
line fault recovery being useful in situations where high-confidence
(or high availability) is important. This is typically the case with
many real-time and embedded mission-critical systems found in
healthcare, avionics, factory automation and automotive systems,
for example.
In the following two sections, we describe the Quest-V architec-
tural design, introducing the goals first, followed by an overview of
the system architecture. This is followed in Section 4 by an exper-
imental evaluation of the system. Here, we show the overheads of
online device driver recovery for a network device, along with the
costs of using hardware virtualization to isolate kernels and system
components. Section 5 describes related work, while conclusions
and future work are discussed in Section 6.
2. Design Goals
The design and ongoing development of Quest-V is centered
around three main goals: safety, predictability and efficiency. As
part of our investigations into system safety, we have studied var-
ious methods for hardware and software fault isolation, including
the use of type-safe languages [7, 20, 24, 25] and hardware fea-
tures such as paging, segmentation [11, 38], and virtual machine
support [3].
Quest-V is intended for safety-critical application domains, re-
quiring high confidence. The National Coordination Office for Net-
working and Information Technology Research and Development
(NCO/NITRD) defines a high confidence system as follows [17]:
“A high confidence system is one in which the consequences of
its behavior are well understood and predictable. It must withstand
internal and external threats and must deal with naturally occur-
ring hazards as well as malicious attacks from a sophisticated and
well-funded adversary. Systems that employ HCS technologies will
be resistant to component failure and malicious manipulation and
will respond to damage or perceived threat by adaptation or recon-
figuration.”
High confidence systems are found in numerous application do-
mains, ranging from healthcare, avionics and automotive systems,
to factory automation and robotics. With the emergence of off-the-
shelf and low-power processors now supporting multiple cores and
hardware virtualization, it seems appropriate that these will become
commonplace within this class of systems. In fact, the ARMCortex
A15 is expected to feature virtualization capabilities, on a process-
ing core typically designed for embedded systems.
The aim of this paper is to show that Quest-V can leverage
virtualization technologies of modern processors, without undue
overhead. We primarily use hardware virtualization support for
memory sandboxing, partitioning the system into a collection of
sandbox kernels that operate collectively as a distributed system
on a chip. This differs from the traditional view of a hypervisor,
or virtual machine monitor, which manages a number of guests
that are logically isolated and operate as though they were mapped
to separate physical machines. Under normal operation, Quest-
V should only incur the overhead of address translation using
shadow page tables. 1 Given hardware support for caching address
translations from guest-virtual to machine-physical address, it is
not necessarily a high cost to pay for the added protection of
1 e.g., Hardware managed extended page tables on Intel x86 processors, or
nested page tables on AMD processors.
a system. In other respects, Quest-V allows sandbox kernels to
communicate via shared memory channels that allow the exchange
of messages, and via which services in one sandbox can access
those in another. Similarly, physical devices are shareable across
sandbox kernels and do not require a monitor to manage them on
behalf of guests.
Finally, although this is not the primary focus of this paper,
Quest-V is designed around time as a first-class resource. We have
been developing the system to support virtual CPUs (VCPUs),
which we will briefly describe in Section 3.4. Fundamentally, the
goal here is to ensure that time management of CPU resources
are accurately accounted on behalf of all threads, either those as-
sociated with conventional tasks or interrupt handlers. Interrupt
handlers are schedulable in Quest-V and their priority is carefully
aligned with any thread that may have initiated them, such as via a
prior I/O request. We have shown this leads to a system that ensures
temporal isolation between tasks and interrupts, so that no such en-
tity ever executes for longer than its budgeted time in any window
of real-time.
3. Quest-V Architecture Overview
As stated earlier, Quest-V relies on virtualization support for safety
and isolation of system software components. The current imple-
mentation runs in 32-bit mode and is designed specifically for Intel
x86 processors with virtual machine extensions. Plans are under-
way to support AMD and future ARM processors.
Unlike most of the traditional hypervisor and virtual machine
systems, Quest-V primarily uses virtualization to implement an ex-
tra logical ring of memory protection into which sandbox address
spaces are mapped. We define a sandbox domain to be a collec-
tion of one or more CPUs and the host physical memory that in-
cludes the local monitor, its sandbox kernel and all local applica-
tions. There is no need for CPU virtualization as the instructions
of each sandbox kernel and its applications execute directly on the
hardware. All x86 instructions that are traditionally troublesome for
“trap and emulate” methods [29] of virtualization are addressed by
hardware features available on modern processors. Similarly, com-
plex I/O virtualization is not necessary with Quest-V since inter-
rupts are directed to sandbox kernels, where they are handled with-
out monitor intervention. Thus, Quest-V is essentially a distributed
collection of sandbox kernels, each isolated using hardware man-
aged page tables and restricted to a set of chosen CPUs.
The overhead of frequent switches between a hypervisor and a
virtual machine (VM) are avoided to the maximum extent under
Quest-V in order to improve performance. This is because a mon-
itor does not exist to support and switch between multiple guest
VMs. Instead, each sandbox kernel operates directly on the host
hardware without monitor intervention, except for fault recovery,
establishment of inter-sandbox communication channels, and initi-
ating shadow page tables.
A high level overview of the Quest-V architecture design is
shown in Figure 1. The details of each system component will be
explained in later sections. A single hypervisor is replaced by a
separate monitor for each sandbox kernel. In effect, memory virtu-
alization becomes an integral design feature of Quest-V, to separate
and recover from faults in system components, while providing per-
formance that is otherwise comparable to a conventional SMP sys-
tem. In fact, given the separation of data structures for each sandbox
kernel, and the largely “share nothing” paradigm adopted by Quest-
V, it is arguably more scalable than traditional SMP systems, al-
though investigation of this is outside the scope of this paper. Here,
we are more interested in describing how Quest-V is designed to
address system component isolation and perform online fault re-
covery without compromising the entire system and requiring a full
reboot. For us, Quest-V’s objective is to meet the demands of high-
confidence, safety-critical application domains.
Figure 1. Quest-V Architecture Overview
The Quest-V architecture supports sandbox kernels that have
both replicated and non-replicated services. That is, some sand-
boxes may have identical kernel functionality, while others parti-
tion various system components to form an asymmetric configura-
tion. The extent to which functionality is separated across kernels is
somewhat configurable in the Quest-V design. In our initial imple-
mentation, each sandbox kernel replicates most functionality, offer-
ing a private version of the corresponding services to its local ap-
plications. Certain functionality is, however, shared across system
components. In particular, we share certain driver data structures
across sandboxes 2, to allow I/O requests and responses to be han-
dled locally. Using shared driver data structures, Quest-V allows
any sandbox to be configured for corresponding device interrupts,
rather than have a dedicated sandbox be responsible for all commu-
nication with that device. This greatly reduces the communication
and control paths necessary for I/O requests from applications in
Quest-V.
The multikernel model of Quest-V allows for software com-
ponent failures in one kernel to be recovered either locally or re-
motely. In local recovery, a trap to the local monitor re-instates the
faulty component in the sandbox kernel. Alternatively, in remote
recovery, the faulty component can be replaced by a replicated or
alternative component in a different sandbox. After recovery, a cor-
responding monitor relaunches the appropriate sandbox kernel to
resume or restart the faulting service. The flexibility of service con-
figuration and fault tolerance make Quest-V capable of providing
reliable services in critical applications with a relatively low over-
head.
It should be noted that, as part of the flexibility of the Quest-V
design, each sandbox kernel can be configured to operate on a cho-
sen subset of CPUs, or cores. In our current approach, we assume
each sandbox kernel is associated with one physical core since
that simplifies local (sandbox) scheduling and allows for relatively
easy enforcement of service guarantees using a variant of rate-
monotonic scheduling [23]. Notwithstanding, application threads
can be migrated between sandboxes as part of a load balancing
strategy.
3.1 Memory Layout
In the current implementation of Quest-V, different sandboxes have
their own (host) physical memory region into which kernel images
2 Only for those drivers that have been mapped as shareable between sand-
boxes.
having almost identical functionality are mapped. Only the BIOS,
certain driver data structures, and communication channels are
shared across sandboxes, while all other functionality is privately
mapped. A simplified layout of the memory partitioning scheme is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Quest-V Memory Layout
Each sandbox kernel image is mapped to physical memory after
the region reserved for the system BIOS, beginning from the low
1MB. As stated earlier, a sandbox kernel can be configured to share
one or more of its device drivers with any other sandboxes. Hard-
ware resources can hence be partitioned for sandbox kernels with
high flexibility and precision. Similarly, a user-level process which
does not require strict memory protection can be loaded into a user
space region accessible across sandboxes. This reduces the cost of
process migration and inter-process communication. However, in
the current Quest-V system, we do not support shared user-spaces
for application processes, instead isolating them within the local
sandbox. While this makes process migration more cumbersome, it
prevents kernel faults in one sandbox from corrupting processes in
others.
Regardless of shared or private user spaces, Quest-V supports
inter-process communication (IPC) between processes in different
sandboxes, using shared memory message passing channels. We
reserve the highest addressable region of physical memory for
this purpose. Finally, a memory region in each sandbox kernel is
reserved for extended page table (EPT) data structures, and is used
for memory protection, as explained in detail later in this section.
3.2 Hardware Virtualization Support
In order to enforce isolation between sandbox kernels, Quest-V uti-
lizes the hardware virtualization support available in most of the
current x86 and the next generation ARM processors to encapsu-
late each sandbox into a virtual machine. As with conventional hy-
pervisors, Quest-V treats a guest VM domain as an extra ring of
memory protection in addition to the traditional kernel and user
privilege levels. However, instead of having one hypervisor for the
whole system, Quest-V has one monitor running in the host domain
for each sandbox as shown earlier in Figure 1. To avoid costly VM
exits and entries, and associated overheads of monitor intervention,
Quest-V grants maximum privilege to each VM domain. This al-
lows each sandbox kernel to operate as though it were in a non-
virtualized domain, except for memory address translation.
3.3 Hardware Assisted Shadow Paging
The isolation provided by memory virtualization requires addi-
tional steps to translate guest virtual addresses to host physical ad-
dresses. Modern processors with hardware support avoid the need
for software managed shadow page tables, and they also support
TLBs to cache various intermediate translation stages.
Figure 3. Extended Page Table Mapping
Figure 3 shows how address translation works for Quest-V
guests (i.e., sandboxes) using Intel’s extended page tables (EPTs).
Specifically, each sandbox kernel uses its own internal paging
structures to translate guest virtual addresses to guest physical ad-
dresses (GPAs). EPT structures are then walked by the hardware
to complete the translation to host physical addresses (HPAs). The
EPT structures are accessed by various bits of the guest physi-
cal address, starting with a pointer to a four-level outer table (the
PML4 table). Each entry (PML4E) holds the host physical address
of a page directory pointer table (PDPT), whose entries (PDPTEs)
address a corresponding page directory table. The remaining two-
levels involve directory and table entries to identify a host frame of
memory, and the offset within that frame.
On modern Intel x86 processors with EPT support, address
mappings can be manipulated at 4KB page granularity. This gives
us a fine grained approach to isolate sandbox kernels and enforce
memory protection. For each 4KB page we have the ability to set
read, write and even execute permissions. Consequently, attempts
by one sandbox to access illegitimate memory regions of another
will incur an EPT violation, causing a trap to the local monitor.
The EPT data structures are, themselves, restricted to access by the
monitors, thereby preventing tampering by sandbox kernels.
By isolating sandboxes with EPT support, malfunctioning sys-
tem components such as a faulty device driver will never be able
to affect host physical memory regions that are either not present
or marked as read-only in the local sandbox’s EPT structures. If
an EPT violation is detected, the monitor for the sandbox that trig-
gered such an event can initiate fault recovery.
3.4 VCPU Scheduling Overview
In Quest-V, virtual CPUs (VCPUs) form the fundamental abstrac-
tion for scheduling and temporal isolation of the system. The con-
cept of a VCPU is similar to that in virtual machines [3, 5], where
a hypervisor provides the illusion of multiple physical CPUs (PC-
PUs) 3 represented as VCPUs to each of the guest virtual machines.
VCPUs exist as kernel abstractions to simplify the management of
resource budgets for potentially many software threads. We use a
hierarchical approach in which VCPUs are scheduled on PCPUs
and threads are scheduled on VCPUs.
A VCPU acts as a resource container [4] for scheduling and
accounting decisions on behalf of software threads. It serves no
other purpose to virtualize the underlying physical CPUs, since
our sandbox kernels and their applications execute directly on the
hardware. In particular, a VCPU does not need to act as a container
for cached instruction blocks that have been generated to emulate
the effects of guest code, as in some trap-and-emulate virtualized
systems.
In common with bandwidth preserving servers [2, 13, 33], each
VCPU, V , has a maximum compute time budget, Cmax, available
in a time period, VT . V is constrained to use no more than the frac-
tion VU = CmaxVT of a physical processor (PCPU) in any window
of real-time, VT , while running at its normal (foreground) priority.
To avoid situations where PCPUs are otherwise idle when there are
threads awaiting service, a VCPU that has expired its budget may
operate at a lower (background) priority. All background priorities
are set distinctly below those of foreground priorities to ensure VC-
PUs with expired budgets do not adversely affect those with avail-
able budgets.
Quest-V defines two classes of VCPUs: (1) Main VCPUs are
used to schedule and track the PCPU usage of conventional soft-
ware threads, while (2) I/O VCPUs are used to account for, and
schedule the execution of, interrupt handlers for I/O devices. We
now describe these two classes in more detail below.
Main VCPUs. In Quest-V, Main VCPUs are by default config-
ured as Sporadic Servers [32]. We use the algorithm proposed by
Stanovich et al [34] that corrects for early replenishment and budget
amplification in the POSIX specification. Fixed priorities are used
rather than dynamic priorities (e.g., associated with deadlines) so
that we can treat the entire system as a collection of equivalent pe-
riodic tasks scheduled by a rate-monotonic scheduler (RMS) [23].
Rate-monotonic analysis can then be used to ensure the utilization
bound on any single PCPU does not exceed that required for a fea-
sible schedule. In this approach, priorities are set inversely propor-
tional to VCPU periods.
While a scheduling class defines a collection of threads and VC-
PUs, it is possible to assign different priorities to VCPUs (and also
threads) within the same class. Moreover, multiple threads within
the same class may share one or more VCPUs for their execution.
By defaulting to a fixed priority scheme for scheduling VCPUs, we
avoid the overhead associated with updating priorities dynamically,
as would be the case if VCPUs had associated deadlines. While the
least upper-bound on utilization for feasible schedules in static pri-
ority systems is often less than for dynamic priority systems, we
consider this to be of lower importance when there are multiple
PCPUs. With the emergence of multi- and many-core processors,
it is arguably less important to guarantee the full utilization of ev-
ery core than it is to provide temporal isolation between threads. In
our case, the motivation is to provide temporal isolation between
VCPUs supporting one or more threads.
Aside from temporal isolation of VCPUs, one additional fac-
tor in the design of Quest-V is the placement of VCPUs on PC-
PUs, to reduce microarchitectural resource contention. Guarantee-
ing a VCPU receives its bandwidth in a specified window of real-
time does not guarantee that a thread using that VCPU will make
efficient use of the corresponding CPU cycles. For example, a
3We define a PCPU to be either a conventional CPU, a processing core, or
a hardware thread in a simultaneous multi-threaded (SMT) system.
thread may stall on cache misses or memory bus bandwidth con-
tention with other threads co-running on other cores. For this rea-
son, Quest-V is being developed with a performance monitoring
subsystem that inspects hardware performance counters to improve
VCPU scheduling [40].
I/O VCPUs. For I/O VCPUs, we have considered several ap-
proaches for bandwidth preservation and scheduling. One approach
is to use Sporadic Servers, but it is not clear what the most appropri-
ate period should be to satisfy all I/O requests and responses. This
is especially problematic when an I/O VCPU is shared amongst
multiple tasks that issue I/O requests at different rates. While it is
possible to dedicate a separate I/O VCPU to each task issuing I/O
requests, so that individual bandwidth and rate requirements can
be established, this adds overhead. Instead, it is preferable to use a
single I/O VCPU for a given device that is shared across multiple
tasks and, hence, Main VCPUs. Consequently, we allow shared I/O
VCPUs to have fixed bandwidths but dynamic priorities that are in-
herited from the Main VCPUs of tasks responsible for I/O requests.
Further details are described in a separate paper [12].
3.5 Inter-Sandbox Communication
Inter-sandbox communication in Quest-V relies on message pass-
ing primitives built on shared memory, and asynchronous event no-
tification mechanisms using Inter-processor Interrupts (IPIs).
As mentioned in Section 3.1, there is a shared memory region
for all the sandboxes in Quest-V in high physical memory. Shared
memory is allocated using a separate physical memory manager
and by default can be accessed by all the sandboxes. Some global
resources that need to be shared among all sandbox kernels will
have to be placed in this area. In the current Quest-V implementa-
tion, for instance, the global locks used to protect shared driver ac-
cess reside in this region. Without isolation, shared memory should
be allocated only when absolutely necessary. If private memory
channels are needed between specific sandboxes, the local monitor
is invoked to set up shadow page table mappings for the required
access control.
By carefully controlling the degree of memory sharing, we can
easily set up message passing channels between specific sandboxes
and protect them from being compromised by any other sandboxes.
A data structure resembling the concept of a mailbox will be set
up on top of shared memory by each end of the communication
channels for the purposes of exchanging messages. Asynchronous
message passing in Quest-V can be supported by either polling for
message reception, or using IPIs. We currently only support polled
message exchanges using a status bit in each relevant mailbox to
determine message arrival.
In addition to the basic message passing mechanism, Quest-
V can also assign VCPUs to message passing threads, to con-
strain sending and receiving behavior in terms of CPU utilization
and, hence, message throughput. This feature makes it possible
for Quest-V to assign priorities and control message transmission
rates for different communication channels, by binding sending
and receiving threads to appropriately configured VCPUs. A ben-
efit of this approach is that VCPUs scheduled using policies such
as rate-monotonic scheduling can be guaranteed real-time shares
of CPU cycles. This enables predictable communication between
sandbox kernels, without unbounded delays for sending and receiv-
ing threads, while at the same time isolating their CPU usage from
other time critical threads in the system.
3.6 Interrupt Distribution and I/O Management
In Quest-V, interrupts are delivered directly to sandbox kernels.
Moreover, all sandbox kernels that share the use of a physical de-
vice all receive interrupts generated by that device. This avoids the
need for interrupt handling to be performed in the context of a
monitor as is typically done with conventional virtual machine ap-
proaches. Quest-V does not need to do this since complex I/O virtu-
alization is not required. Instead, early demultiplexing in the sand-
boxed device drivers determines if subsequent interrupt handling
should be processed locally. If that is not the case, the local sandbox
simply discontinues further handling of the interrupt. We believe
this to be less expensive than the cost of going through a dedicated
coordinator as is done in Xen [5] and Helios [26], amongst others.
In order for the sandbox kernels to share a piece of hardware,
we first need to find a way to deliver interrupts to them. This can be
done either through interrupt broadcasting or IPIs. Most hardware
platforms, including x86, provide an external programmable inter-
rupt controller through which interrupts can be directed to specific
processor cores and, hence, sandbox kernels. A logical structure
of the Local and I/O APICs in Intel Xeon processors is shown in
Figure 4.
Figure 4. Local and I/O APICs in Intel Xeon Processors
If such a mechanism is not available or somehow prohibitive
in certain scenarios, we can also direct interrupts to one physical
processor and then use IPIs to simulate the broadcast. However, in
the current Quest-V implementation, the I/O APIC is programmed
to broadcast specific hardware device interrupts to all the sandboxes
sharing that device. We also use this technique to re-route interrupts
in case of fault recovery in a remote sandbox kernel, which will be
discussed later.
Aside from interrupt handling, device drivers need to be writ-
ten to support inter-sandbox sharing. Certain data structures have
to be duplicated for each sandbox kernel, while others are pro-
tected by synchronization primitives. This is, in fact, a form of
software-based I/O virtualization, although not as complex as that
required by many hypervisors, which must manage transfers be-
tween devices and guests. The duplication of certain driver data
structures, and the need for synchronization on shared data may
impact the performance of hardware devices multiplexed between
sandboxes. However, with the emergence of I/O virtualization tech-
nology, some hardware support for device sharing is now avail-
able. Technologies such as Intel’s SR-IOV [19] could be useful for
Quest-V. The basic idea here is combining early demultiplexing and
separated DMA buffers to create a virtual view of the same device
amongst those sandbox kernels using the device.
3.7 Fault Recovery
Fault detection is, itself, a topic worthy of separate discussion.
In this paper, we assume the existence of techniques to identify
faults. In Quest-V, faults are easily detected if they generate EPT
violations, thereby triggering control transfer to a corresponding
monitor. More elaborate schemes for identifying faults will be
covered in our future work. In this section, we explain the details
of how fault recovery is performed without requiring a full system
reboot.
The multikernel approach adopted by Quest-V allows for fault
recovery either in the local sandbox, where the fault occurred, or in
a remote sandbox that is presumably unaffected. Upon detection of
a fault, a method for passing control to the local monitor is required.
If the fault does not automatically trigger a VM-exit, it can be
forced by a fault handler issuing an appropriate instruction. 4 An
astute reader might assume that carefully crafted malicious attacks
to compromise a system might try to rewrite fault detection code
within a sandbox, thereby preventing a monitor from ever gaining
control. First, this should not be possible if the fault detection code
is presumed to exist in read-only memory, which should be the case
for the sandbox kernel text segment. This segment cannot be made
write accessible since any code executing with the sandbox will not
have access to the EPT mappings controlling host memory access.
However, it is still possible for malicious code to exist in writable
regions of a sandbox, including parts of the data segment. To guard
against compromised sandboxes that lose the capability to pass
control to their monitor as part of fault recovery, certain procedures
can be adopted. One such approach would be to periodically force
traps to the monitor using a preemption timeout [1]. This way,
the fault detection code could itself be within the monitor, thereby
isolated from any possible tampering from a malicious attacker or
faulty software component. Many of these techniques are still under
development in Quest-V and will be considered in our future work.
Assuming that a fault detection event has either triggered a trap
into a monitor, or the monitor itself is triggered via a preemption
timeout and executes a fault detector, we now describe how the
handling phase proceeds.
Local Fault Recovery. In the case of local recovery, the corre-
sponding monitor is required to release the allocated memory for
the faulting components. If insufficient information is available
about the extent of system damage, the monitor may decide to re-
initialize the entire local sandbox, as in the case of initial system
launch. Any active communication channels with other sandboxes
may be affected, but the remote sandboxes that are otherwise iso-
lated will be able to proceed as normal.
As part of local recovery, the monitor may decide to replace the
faulting component, or components, with alternative implementa-
tions of the same services. For example, an older version of a device
driver that is perhaps not as efficient as a recent update, but is per-
haps more rigorously tested, may be used in recovery. Such compo-
nent replacements can lead to system robustness through functional
or implementation diversity [42]. That is, a component suffering a
fault or compromised attack may be immune to the same fault or
compromising behavior if implemented in an alternative way. The
alternative implementation could, perhaps, enforce more stringent
checks on argument types and ranges of values that a more effi-
cient but less safe implementation might avoid. Observe that alter-
native representations of software components could be resident in
host physical memory, and activated via a monitor that adjusts EPT
mappings for the sandboxed guest.
Remote Fault Recovery. Quest-V also supports the recovery of a
faulty software component in an alternative sandbox. This may be
4 For example, on the x86, the cpuid instruction forces a VM-exit.
more appropriate in situations where a replacement for the com-
promised service already exists, and which does not require a sig-
nificant degree of re-initialization. While an alternative sandbox ef-
fectively resumes execution of a prior service request, possibly in-
volving a user-level thread migration, the corrupted sandbox can be
“healed” in the background. This is akin to a distributed system in
which one of the nodes is taken off-line while it is being upgraded
or repaired.
In Quest-V, remote fault recovery involves the local monitor
identifying a target sandbox. There are many possible policies for
choosing a target sandbox that will resume an affected service
request. However, one simple approach is to pick any available
sandbox in random order, or according to a round-robin policy.
In more complex decision-making situations, a sandbox may be
chosen according to its current load. Either way, the local monitor
informs the target sandbox via an IPI. Control is then passed to a
remote monitor, which performs the fault recovery. Although out of
the scope of this paper, information needs to be exchanged between
monitors about the actions necessary for fault recovery and what
threads, if any, need to be migrated.
Figure 5. NIC Driver Remote Recovery
An example of remote recovery involving a network interface
cased (NIC) driver is shown in Figure 5. Here, an IPI is issued
from the faulting sandbox kernel to the remote sandbox kernel
via their respective monitors, in order to kick-start the recovery
procedures after the fault has been detected. For the purposes of
our implementation, an arbitrary target sandbox was chosen. The
necessary state information needed to restore service is retrieved
from shared memory using message passing if available. In our
simple tests, we assume that the NIC driver’s state is not recovered,
but instead the driver is completely re-initialized. This means that
any prior in-flight requests using the NIC driver will be discarded.
The major phases of remote recovery are listed in both the
flow chart and diagram of Figure 5. In this example, the faulting
NIC driver overwrites the message channel in the local sandbox
kernel. After receiving an IPI, the remote monitor resumes its
sandbox kernel at a point that re-initializes the NIC driver. The
newly selected sandbox responsible for recovery then redirects
network interrupts to itself. Observe that in general this may not
be necessary because interrupts from the network may already be
broadcast and, hence, received by the target sandbox. Likewise, in
this example, the target sandbox is capable of influencing interrupt
redirection via an I/O APIC because of established capabilities
granted by its monitor. It may be the case that a monitor does
not allow such capabilities to be given to its sandbox kernel, in
which case the corresponding monitor would be responsible for the
interrupt redirection.
When all the necessary kernel threads and user processes are
restarted in the remote kernel, the network service will be brought
up online. In our example, the local sandbox (with the help of its
monitor) will identify the damaged message channel and try to
restore it locally in step 4.
In the current implementation of Quest-V, we assume that all re-
covered services are re-initialized and any outstanding requests are
either discarded or can be resumed without problems. In general,
many software components may require a specific state of opera-
tion to be restored for correct system resumption. In such cases,
we would need a scheme similar to those adopted in transactional
systems, to periodically checkpoint recoverable state. Snapshots of
such state can be captured by local monitors at periodic intervals,
or other appropriate times, and stored in memory outside the scope
of each sandbox kernel.
4. Experimental Evaluation
We conducted a series of experiments that compared Quest-V to
both a Quest system without virtualization support, and also Linux.
These experiments were intended to show the isolation, reliabil-
ity and efficiency of the Quest-V design. The target machine was
a Dell PowerEdge T410 server with an Intel Xeon E5506 proces-
sor, featuring 4 physical cores with both VMX and EPT support,
along with 4GB RAM. An external PCIe Realtek R8169 network
interface card was used for all network-related experiments.
4.1 Driver Fault Recovery
To demonstrate the system component fault recovery mechanism
of Quest-V, we intentionally broke the Realtek R8169 NIC driver
in one sandbox kernel, and tried to recover from the failure both
locally in the current sandbox and remotely in another sandbox.
The functioning status of the network sub-system was verified by
a continuous stream of ICMP requests. By pinging the Quest-V
test machine from another machine at a fixed rate during recovery,
we measured the system down time and noted the extent to which
ICMP packets were disrupted. This was possible by observing the
received packet sequence numbers.
The total time spent on receiving 50 ICMP replies along with
the down time caused by the driver fault recovery were recorded.
To compare the efficiency of single component recovery versus a
full system reboot, we also performed the same experiment for the
case of a hardware reset (i.e., machine reboot). The results of the
experiments are shown in Figure 6.
In both cases, the recovery begins after the reception of the
twentieth ICMP echo reply. An ICMP echo request is sent every
500 milliseconds, as shown by the “ICMP Request” rate in the
figure. As expected, the down-time of online recovery is much
shorter than with a system reboot. The results for both local and
remote recovery turn out to be very similar, so we only show the
local recovery result in the figure.
As mentioned earlier, the network card driver local recovery
process involves fault detection, followed by replacing and re-
initializing the physical driver. Since fault detection is not in the
scope of this paper, we triggered the fault recovery event manually
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Figure 6. NIC Driver Recovery
Phases CPU CyclesLocal Recovery Remote Recovery
VM-Exit 707
Driver Switch 12427 N/A
IPI Round Trip N/A 1291
VM-Enter 823
Driver Re-initialization 134244605
Network Re-initialization 68750060
Table 1. Overhead of Different Phases in Fault Recovery
by assuming an error occurred. Hence the down time involved only
a driver replacement and re-initialization. However, since the NIC
driver is closely coupled with the network interface, we also needed
to bring down the old interface and start a new one for the sandbox.
The time Quest-V spent on different phases of the recovery
is shown in Table 1. For most system components, we expect re-
initialization to be the most significant recovery cost.
4.2 Forkwait Microbenchmark
To identify the costs of hardware virtualization in Quest-V, we gen-
erated a forkwait microbenchmark similar to that performed by
Adams and Agesen [3]. In Quest-V, sandboxes spend most of their
life-time in guest kernel mode, and system calls that trigger context
switches will not induce VM-Exits to a monitor. Consequently, we
tried to measure the overhead of hardware virtualization on nor-
mal system calls for Intel x86 processors. We chose the forkwait
microbenchmark because it involves two relatively sophisticated
system calls (fork and waitpid), involving both privilege level
switches and memory operations.
Pseudocode for our forkwait program is outlined in Listing 1.
p i d t p i d ;
i n t i , s t a t u s ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 40000 ; i ++) {
p id = f o r k ( ) ;
i f ( p i d == 0) e x i t ( 0 ) ;
e l s e i f ( p i d < 0) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
e l s e wa i t p i d ( pid , &s t a t u s , 0 ) ;
}
Listing 1. Forkwait Pseudo Code
40000 new processes were forked in each set of experiments
and the total CPU cycles were recorded. We then compared the
performance of Quest-V against a version of Quest without hard-
ware virtualization enabled, as well as a Linux 2.6.32 kernel in both
32- and 64-bit configurations. Results are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Forkwait Microbenchmark
We can see from the results that hardware virtualization does
not add any obvious overhead to Quest-V system calls, and both
Quest and Quest-V took less time than Linux to complete their
executions. Even though this is not an entirely fair comparison
because Quest is far less feature-rich than Linux, it should be
clear that our approach of using hardware virtualization support
for isolating software components is not prohibitive in the case of
system calls.
4.3 Interrupt Distribution and Handling
Besides system calls, device interrupts also require control to be
passed to a kernel. We therefore conducted a series of experiments
to show the overheads of hardware virtualization on interrupt de-
livery and handling in Quest-V. For comparison, we recorded the
number of interrupts that occurred and the total round trip time to
process 30000 ping packets on both Quest and Quest-V machines.
In this case, the ICMP requests were issued in 3 millisecond inter-
vals from a remote machine. The results are shown in Figure 8.
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Notice that in Quest, all the network interrupts are directed to
one core and in Quest-V, we broadcast network interrupts to all
cores but only one core (i.e., one sandbox kernel) actually handles
them. Each sandbox kernel in Quest-V performs early demultiplex-
ing to identify the target for interrupt delivery, discontinuing the
processing of interrupts that are not meant to be locally processed.
Consequently, the overhead with Quest-V also includes broadcast-
ing of interrupts from the I/O APIC. However, we can see from the
results that the performance difference between Quest and Quest-V
is almost negligible, meaning neither hardware virtualization nor
broadcasting of interrupts is prohibitive. It should be noted that
Quest-V does not require intervention of a monitor to process inter-
rupts. Instead, interrupts are directed to sandbox kernels according
to rules setup in corresponding virtual machine control structures.
4.4 Inter-Sandbox Communication
The messaging passing mechanism in Quest-V is built on shared
memory, and since we do not support NUMA for now, its perfor-
mance is mostly affected by memory access, cache and schedul-
ing costs. Instead of focusing on memory and cache optimization,
we tried to study the impact of scheduling on message passing in
Quest-V.
Specifically, we setup two kernel threads in two different sand-
box kernels and assigned a VCPU to each of them. One kernel
thread used a 4KB shared memory message passing channel to
communicate with the other thread. In the first case, the two VC-
PUs were the highest priority with their respective sandbox kernels.
In the second case, the two VCPUs were assigned lower utiliza-
tions and priorities, to identify the effects of VCPU parameters (and
scheduling) on the message sending and receiving rates. In both
cases, the time to transfer messages of various sizes across the com-
munication channel was measured. Note that the VCPU scheduling
framework ensures that all threads are guaranteed service as long
as the total utilization of all VCPUs is bounded according to rate-
monotonic theory [23]. Consequently, the impacts of message pass-
ing on overall system performance can be controlled and isolated
from the execution of other threads in the system.
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Figure 9. Message Passing Microbenchmark
Figure 9 shows the time spent exchanging messages of various
sizes. Note that the x-axis in the figure is plotted using a log
scale.Quest-V Hi is the plot for message exchanges involving high-
priority VCPUs having utilizations of 50% for both the sender and
receiver. Quest-V Low is the plot for message exchanges involving
low-priority VCPUs having utilizations of 40% for both the sender
and receiver. As can be seen, the VCPU parameters have an effect
on message transfer times.
In our experiments, the time spent for each size of message
was averaged over a minimum of 5000 trials to normalize the
scheduling overhead. The communication costs grow linearly with
increasing message size, because they include the time to write the
message to, and read it from, memory. Discounting the memory
read and write costs, the overhead is a constant to identify the
shared memory address for a message.
4.5 Isolation
To demonstrate the fault isolation and recovery features of Quest-
V, we designed a scenario that includes both message passing
and network service across 4 different sandboxes. Specifically,
sandbox 1 has a kernel thread that sends messages through private
message passing channels to sandbox 0, 2 and 3. Each private
channel is shared only between the sender and specific receiver,
and is guarded by shadow page tables. In addition, sandbox 0 also
has a network service running that handles ICMP echo requests.
After all the services are up and running, we manually break the
NIC driver in sandbox 0, overwrite sandbox 0’s message passing
channel shared with sandbox 1, and try to wipe out the kernel
memory of other sandboxes to simulate a driver fault. After the
driver fault, sandbox 0 will try to recover the NIC driver along
with both network and message passing services running in it.
During the recovery, the whole system activity is plotted in terms
of message reception rate and ICMP echo reply rate in all available
sandboxes and the results are shown in Figure 10.
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In the experiment, sandbox 1 broadcasts messages to others
at 50 millisecond intervals, while sandbox 0, 2 and 3 receive at
100, 800 and 1000 millisecond intervals. Also, another machine
in the local network sends ICMP echo requests at 500 millisecond
intervals to sandbox 0.
We can see from the results that an interruption of service
happened for both message passing and network packet processing
in sandbox 0, but all the other sandboxes were unaffected. This
is because each sandbox has its physical memory separated from
the others through hardware assisted shadow paging (EPT in x86).
When the “faulty” driver in sandbox 0 tries to overwrite memory of
the other sandboxes, it simply traps into the local monitor because
of a memory violation. Consequently, the only memory that the
driver can wipe out is only the writable memory in sandbox 0.
Hence all the monitors and all the other sandboxes will remain
protected from this failure.
4.6 Shared Driver Performance
Quest-V supports device driver sharing, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.6. A simple I/O virtualization strategy allows a physical
driver to be mapped into all sandboxes requiring access to the same
device, with each sandbox handling device interrupts locally. This
differs from traditional I/O virtualization techniques in which in-
terrupts are first handled in a monitor. An example shared driver
in Quest-V might be for a single NIC device, providing a separate
virtual interface for each sandbox requiring access. This allows for
each sandbox to have its own IP address and even a virtual MAC
address for the same physical NIC.
We compared the performance of our shared driver design to the
I/O virtualization adopted by Xen 4.1.2 and VMware Player 4.0.
We used an x86 64 root-domain (Dom0) for Xen, based on Linux
3.1. VMPlayer was hosted by a Fedora Core 16 64-bit Linux. We
also used Ubuntu Linux 10.04 (32-bit kernel version 2.6.32) as a
base case system without I/O virtualization. In all cases, a flood of
30000 ICMP echo requests were delivered to each guest, or system,
on a target host with a Realtek NIC. The round-trip response time
was recorded on each machine acting as the source of the ICMP
ping packets. Figure 11 shows the results for the target host running
different OS configurations in separate ping flood experiments.
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Figure 11. Shared NIC Driver Performance
The “No VT” case compares Quest without virtualization
against Ubuntu Linux. Both systems show almost identical per-
formance. In the “Single Guest” case, one sandbox kernel accesses
the NIC in Quest-V. For comparison, we show results for a single
Linux VM hosted by VMPlayer, and a single Linux user-domain
(DomU) hosted by Xen. Two separate experiments were performed
using Xen: “Xen (pvm)” featured guest paravirtualization, while
“Xen (hvm)” used hardware virtualization. For both VMPlayer and
Xen, we again used Ubuntu Linux 10.04 guests. Results indicate
the virtualization overhead of Quest-V is less than for VMPlayer
and Xen. This is the case even when Xen uses paravirtualization.
Finally, to show the effects of device sharing, we first have
two sandboxes in Quest-V receiving ping packets via separate IP
addresses. Here, two separate hosts act as the source of ping packets
delivered to the target machine. For comparison, two Linux VMs
hosted by VMPlayer, and two Linux DomUs in Xen also receive
network ping traffic via the same physical NIC. The average round-
trip response time for both guests (or sandboxes) is recorded in the
“Two Guests” case. Results show that device sharing affects the
performance of all systems but Quest-V has lower overhead than
both VMPlayer and Xen. These initial results suggest Quest-V’s
shared driver approach is not prohibitive to performance.
4.7 Discussion
As stated earlier, Quest-V uses hardware virtualization primarily
for memory isolation of sandbox kernels, for heightened depend-
ability. The experiments show that the overheads of using virtual-
ization in this manner are not significant compared to a conven-
tional non-virtualized SMP system. In fact, Quest-V conducts most
of its operation without intervention of a monitor, except to estab-
lish shadow page tables, launch sandbox kernels, and handle faults.
Only the added address translation costs are incurred under normal
operation.
For situations where a conventional system might be compro-
mised and require a full reboot, Quest-V only has to perform online
recovery of the sandbox kernel that is at fault. Experiments show
that online fault recovery is possible with Quest-V and the approach
is potentially applicable to a wider range of situations than we have
discussed. For mission-critical applications, where the cost of re-
boot and loss of system functionality for this period of time is po-
tentially disastrous, Quest-V is a possible solution. Online recovery
allows unaffected parts of the system to remain functional, without
any down-time.
Although we have only shown a relatively simple example for
online recovery, using a ICMP network-level experiment that is
largely stateless, it is still possible to support stateful recovery
schemes. Such schemes would likely have to checkpoint state, in
the same way transactional systems work [30], and roll-back to the
last checkpoint in their recovery. To prevent the checkpointed state
itself being corrupted by a fault, Quest-V could take advantage of
memory regions accessible only to the local monitor of each sand-
box. In this way, checkpoints would require VM-exit transitions
from sandbox kernels to monitors to take snapshots of execution
state. While VM-exits and entries incur almost a thousand clock
cycles or more of overhead, this can be ameliorated by less fre-
quent checkpoints, at the cost of potentially further rollback during
system recovery.
5. Related Work
The concept of a multikernel is featured in Barrelfish[6], which
has greatly influenced our work. Barrelfish replicates system state
rather than sharing it, to avoid the costs of synchronization and
management of shared data structures. The overall design is meant
to be hardware-neutral with only the message transport mecha-
nism and hardware interface being architecturally specific. As with
Quest-V, communication between kernels is via explicit message
passing, using shared memory channels to transfer cache-line-sized
messages. In contrast to Barrelfish, Quest-V uses virtualization
mechanisms to partition separate kernel services as part of our
goal to develop high-confidence systems. Reliability and fault tol-
erance is key to the design of Quest-V, which we aim to use in
real-time, safety-critical application domains. Shadow page table
structures, such as those supported by hardware virtualization, en-
sure immutable protection capabilities between kernel components.
Systems such as Hive [10] and Factored OS (FOS) [39] also
take the view of designing a system as a distributed collection of
kernels on a single chip. FOS is primarily designed for scalability
on manycore systems with potentially 100s to 1000s of cores. Each
OS service is factored into a set of communicating servers that col-
lectively operate together. In FOS, kernel services are partitioned
across spatially-distinct servers executing on separate cores, avoid-
ing contention on hardware resources such as caches and TLBs.
Quest-V differs from FOS in its primary focus, since the former
is aimed at fault recovery and dependable computing. Moreover,
Quest-V manages resources across both space and time, providing
real-time resource management that is not featured in the scalable
collection of microkernels forming FOS.
Hive [10] is a standalone OS that targets features of the Stanford
FLASH processor to assign groups of processing nodes to cells.
Each cell represents a collection of kernels that communicate via
message exchanges. The whole system is partitioned so that hard-
ware and software faults are limited to the cells in which they oc-
cur. Such fault containment is similar to that provided by virtual
machine sandboxing, which Quest-V relies upon. However, unlike
Quest-V, Hive enforces isolation using special hardware firewall
features on the FLASH architecture.
There have been several notable systems relying on virtualiza-
tion techniques to enforce logical isolation and implement scalable
resource management on multicore and multiprocessor platforms.
Disco [9] is a virtual machine monitor (VMM) that was key to the
revival in virtualization in the 1990s. It supports multiple guests on
multiprocessor platforms. Memory overheads are reduced by trans-
parently sharing data structures such as the filesystem buffer cache
between virtual machines.
Xen[5] is a subsequent VMM that uses a special driver do-
main and (now optional) paravirtualization techniques [41] to sup-
port multiple guests. In contrast to VMMs such as Disco and Xen,
Quest-V operates as a single system with sandbox kernels poten-
tially implementing different services that are isolated using mem-
ory virtualization. Aside from a monitor on each core being used
for establishing shadow pages and handling faults, the sandbox
kernels of Quest-V are given direct access to devices and physical
CPUs. This greatly reduces the cost of virtualization. For example,
it allows I/O requests to be initiated and delivered directly to any
core, as in a typical SMP system without I/O virtualization over-
heads.
Cellular Disco [16] extends the Disco VMM with support for
hardware fault containment. As with Hive, the system is partitioned
into cells, each containing a copy of the monitor code and all
machine memory pages belonging to the cell’s nodes. A failure
of one cell only affects the VMs using resources in the cell. In
effect, Cellular Disco treats a shared memory multiprocessor as a
virtual cluster. Quest-V does not focus explicitly on hardware fault
containment but its system partitioning into separate kernels means
that it is possible to support such features. While we do not focus
on this aspect, it is also possible for Quest-V to define domains, or
cells, in which a monitor is established for a cluster of cores rather
than just one. The design of Quest-V is not inherently tied to one
core per sandbox kernel.
Another system that adopts the concept of multiple kernels is
Helios [26]. Helios features satellite kernels that execute on het-
erogeneous platforms, including graphics processing units, net-
work interface cards, or specific NUMA nodes. Applications and
services can be off-loaded to special purpose devices to reduce
the load on a given CPU. Helios builds upon Singularity [18]
and all satellite microkernels communicate via message channels.
Device interrupts are directed to a coordinator kernel, which re-
stricts the location of drivers. In Quest-V, I/O APICs are allowed
to broadcast interrupts to all accessible Local APICs, where early-
demultiplexing [37] drivers detect whether the interrupt should
be subsequently handled or discarded in the context of a time-
budgeted I/O VCPU.
Helios, Singularity, and the Sealed Process Architecture [18] en-
force dependability and safety using language support based on C#.
Singularity, in particular, enforces isolation between software com-
ponents mapped to software isolated processes, which are logically
separated from an underlying microkernel. In Quest-V, virtualiza-
tion techniques are used to isolate software components. While this
may seem more expensive, we have seen on modern processors
with hardware virtualization support that this is not the case.
In other work, Corey[8] is a library OS providing an interface
similar to the Exokernel[14], and which attempts to address the bot-
tlenecks of data sharing across modern multicore systems. Corey
provides several abstractions, most notably shares, address ranges
and processing cores that are managed by library OSes and which
can be space-partitioned between applications. The kernel core fea-
ture of Corey provides the ability to allow applications to dedi-
cate cores to kernel functions and data. A kernel core can manage
hardware devices and execute system calls sent from other cores.
Multiple application cores then communicate with the kernel core
via shared memory IPC. This is a bit different from Quest-V in
that Quest-V asks multiple sandboxes to share a system component
(shared drivers) if necessary. However, the flexibility of Quest-V
allows it to be configured either way. We chose the former way
to eliminate the overhead of IPC and control flow transfer that in-
volves a monitor. Notwithstanding, with driver support it is possible
to adopt the same approach as Corey.
Finally, Quest-V has similarities to systems that support self-
healing, such as ASSURE [31] and Vigilant [27]. Such self-healing
systems contrast with those that attempt to verify their functional
correctness before deployment. seL4 [22] attempts to verify that
faults will never occur at runtime, but as yet has not been devel-
oped for platforms supporting parallel execution of threads (e.g.,
multicore processors). Regardless, verification is only as good as
the rules against which invariant properties are being judged, and
as a last line of defense Quest-V is able to recover at runtime from
unforeseen errors.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper describes a system, called Quest-V, which uses virtu-
alization to isolate system software components for improved re-
liability. We use hardware virtualization to isolate separate kernel
images and their applications on the different cores of a multicore
processor. This leads to a system design that resembles a distributed
system on a chip. Shadow page tables control the access rights to
host physical memory for each kernel. This ensures that faults in
one kernel do not affect the memory spaces of others, thereby en-
suring fault isolation. Our goal is to support high-confidence sys-
tems that must ensure survivability in the face of faults and poten-
tial attacks that may compromise system integrity. This is particu-
larly important in real-time safety-critical domains.
With our approach, we are able to implement different services
across sandbox kernels. Additionally, through a fault detection and
recovery system, we are able to replace faulty services with alterna-
tive implementations in another sandbox kernel. We describe sev-
eral experiments to show that the overheads of using virtualization
technology for fault isolation is not prohibitive. Interrupts and com-
munication between kernels do not require intervention of a mon-
itor, as is typically the case with traditional virtual machine sys-
tems. Similarly, device drivers execute within sandbox kernels as
they would in conventional non-virtualized systems. That is, they
do not have to be specifically tailored to a virtual domain, provid-
ing a different interface to that of the underlying hardware, as is the
case in systems using paravirtualization [5, 41].
A case study, using a network device driver shows how potential
faults in one sandbox kernel can be recovered with the help of
a local monitor. The costs of fault recovery are significantly less
than would be the case with a full system reboot. We provide a
simple example using network packet transfer, to demonstrate how
a faulty driver can be restored in the original sandbox or even an
alternative sandbox. Quest-V allows alternative versions of services
to exist in different sandbox kernels, so that if one such service is
compromised (e.g., via a malicious attack from a network intruder)
a different version may be used as a replacement during recovery.
This, then, allows for multiple versions of services to exist, perhaps
trading performance for reliability.
This paper assumes the existence of a fault detection mecha-
nism, which transfers control to a monitor. In future work, we will
investigate techniques for fault detection and recovery that allow
services to be resumed for stateful tasks. This would require recov-
ery techniques similar to those in transactional systems [30].
Finally, although Quest-V is a working multikernel that uses
hardware virtualization for protection and fault recovery, it is still
fairly limited compared to more mature systems such as Linux.
Quest-V lacks the rich APIs and libraries commonly found in mod-
ern systems, which restricts our ability to draw direct comparisons
against current alternatives. Our future plans are to develop Quest-
V with more extensive features, while continuing to leverage mul-
ticore and hardware virtualization capabilities. We will use hard-
ware performance counters to improve the efficient and predictable
management of hardware resources, including shared caches and
NUMA interconnects. We hope Quest-V will pave the way for fu-
ture highly reliable, self-healing systems. Along with complemen-
tary techniques, such as static verification, we will continue our
development of a system that focuses on three goals: safety, pre-
dictability and efficiency.
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